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Network reciprocity has been widely advertised in theoretical
studies as one of the basic cooperation-promoting mechanisms,
but experimental evidence favoring this type of reciprocity was
published only recently. When organized in an unchanging net-
work of social contacts, human subjects cooperate provided the
following strict condition is satisfied: The benefit of cooperation
must outweigh the total cost of cooperating with all neighbors.
In an attempt to relax this condition, we perform social dilemma
experiments wherein network reciprocity is aided with another
theoretically hypothesized cooperation-promoting mechanism—
costly punishment. The results reveal how networks promote
and stabilize cooperation. This stabilizing effect is stronger in a
smaller-size neighborhood, as expected from theory and experi-
ments. Contrary to expectations, punishment diminishes the ben-
efits of network reciprocity by lowering assortment, payoff per
round, and award for cooperative behavior. This diminishing
effect is stronger in a larger-size neighborhood. An immediate
implication is that the psychological effects of enduring punish-
ment override the rational response anticipated in quantitative
models of cooperation in networks.
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From ancient hunters to modern civilizations, the stabilityof human societies has been maintained via various kinds
of partnerships in which a cooperator usually incurs a cost to
benefit others (i.e., altruistic phenotype) (1–3). It is unclear,
however, why natural selection would favor cooperativeness
amongst selfish individuals (4, 5). Aiming to resolve this puz-
zle, researchers from multiple disciplines have relied on evolu-
tionary game theory to better understand how the benefit dis-
advantage could be overcome in the face of exploitation (6–8).
A quintessential model in evolutionary games has been the pris-
oner’s dilemma (PD), a succinct formulation of the tradeoff
between cooperating for a common good and defecting for a per-
sonal interest (9, 10). In a PD game, the said tradeoff is faced by
two opponents who choose between cooperation (C ) and defec-
tion (D) to obtain seemingly the best possible payoff. One of the
first approaches toward resolving the PD originated from the fact
that cooperation in the real world often involves repeated inter-
actions. This insight sparked a considerable interest—and ulti-
mately progress—in understanding the evolution of cooperation
from both theoretical and experimental viewpoints (11–15).
Past studies show that alleviating the decline of cooperation in
repeated interactions calls for (i) particularly crafted strategies
such as tit-for-tat (16), (ii) collective scoring and information-
sharing schemes to establish reputation (17, 18), (iii) positive
behavioral reinforcement with reward (19–21), or (iv) social-
control mechanisms as exemplified by costly punishment (22–
25). Here, costly punishment (P) is an independent action that
lets an individual purposely incur a cost in order for the oppo-
nent to pay an even higher fine. This action has the potential to
help cooperative trends (26–28), but it is not without controversy.
When punishment is available, for instance, there is a valid con-
cern of second-order free-riding. Furthermore, within the frame-
work of indirect reciprocity, costly punishment provides only a
narrow margin for the perseverance of cooperation, and the col-
lective benefit is often reduced (29). Experiments involving social
dilemma games also raise some doubts about the role of costly
punishment because there are instances when punishment is sim-
ply ineffective (30, 31), and even when it is effective, the most
successful individuals refuse to punish others (31, 32).
Another recognized cooperation-promoting factor is social
structure (5, 8, 15). When individuals are arranged in a network
of contacts, the only possible interactions are with immediate
neighbors. In such circumstances, theory predicts that coopera-
tive individuals self-organize into clusters to avoid being wiped
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out by defectors, thus giving rise to the notion of network
reciprocity (33). This concept has been extensively tested with
respect to network topology, for which theory suggests that het-
erogeneous connectivities are very effective in maintaining high
levels of cooperation (34–37). Even in two interdependent net-
works, cooperativeness can be increased via synchronous forma-
tion of correlated clusters (38). Despite all of the attention from
theorists, experimental evidence of the effectiveness of network
reciprocity is fairly recent (39). A surprising result contradicting
theoretical findings is that heterogeneous networks seem to be
of little relevance for promoting cooperation (40). In dynamic
networks, furthermore, only slow partner updating rate is capa-
ble of promoting cooperation by increasing assortativeness of the
whole network (41–43).
Experiments show that network reciprocity promotes cooper-
ation under a restrictive condition: The benefit of cooperation
must outweigh the total cost of cooperating with all neighbors
(39). Our question, therefore, is whether this condition can be
relaxed by combining two cooperation-promoting mechanisms.
Specifically, are there any synergies to be gained by aiding net-
work reciprocity with costly punishment? Across a wide array
of model definitions and hypotheses, quantitative approaches
suggest a positive answer because costly punishment enhances
cooperativeness, sometimes in abrupt manners that are reminis-
cent of first-order-like phase transitions in physics (44–46). Here,
we attempt to validate these theoretical results by performing a
social dilemma experiment and examining whether the option
to punish helps improve the overall level of cooperation among
individuals arranged in an unchanging (i.e., static) network of
contacts.
We divided the experiment into three separate trials. In the
control treatment (CD), participants played a traditional PD
game in which C and D were the only available actions. Each
participant interacted with two other individuals in one round,
after which connections were randomly reshuffled to simulate
the well-mixed interaction. The static network treatment with
two neighbors (CD2) consisted of the same game as CD but with-
out reshuffling. The purpose was to measure the effectiveness of
network reciprocity relative to CD. Finally, the static network
treatment with punishment (CDP2) consisted of the same game
as CD2, with P being available as an independent action. The
purpose was to detect synergies between network reciprocity and
punishment. Although it is possible to enrich the control treat-
ment with action P , we did not consider such an enrichment
because the resulting setting would have been very similar to that
of refs. 30–32. In total, 225 participants were recruited to play 50
rounds of the game. The experiment was approved by the Tian-
jin University of Finance and Economics, as well as the Yunnan
Fig. 1. Punishment fails to boost the cooperation-promoting effect of network reciprocity. Pairwise comparisons indicate that network reciprocity (CD2)
effectively increases the frequency of cooperation and decreases the frequency of defection relative to the well-mixed interactions (CD). Introducing
punishment (CDP2) has no effect on the frequency of cooperation beyond the level established by network reciprocity. Punishment is used seldomly, most
often as a substitute for defection. Box-and-whisker plots with notches characterize the empirical distribution of action frequencies. Box height determines
the IQR, while the horizontal lines in between represent the median. Notches make visual pairwise comparisons possible by indicating the 95% confidence
intervals for the median. Whisker height is such that 99.3% of normally distributed data would be within the whisker-defined range. Points outside of this
range are drawn as outliers.
University of Finance and Economics Ethics Committees on the
use of human participants in research, and carried out in accor-
dance with all relevant guidelines. In particular, informed con-
sent was obtained from all participants. The game was character-









C 2 -2 -5
D 4 0 -3
P 2 -2 -5
. [1]
1Own and 2foe’s benefit or cost
Because administering punishment requires effort, P is a costly
action and a punisher pays one unit. A punishee experiences a
relatively high loss of four units as a consequence. The exact
ratio of 1:4 follows the recommendation from ref. 32. Further
details on methodology are given in Materials and Methods and
SI Appendix, SI Materials and Methods.
Results
Statistical data analyses revealed that network reciprocity pro-
motes cooperation (Fig. 1). We report cooperativeness and its
variation in terms of the median (M ) and the interquartile
range (IQR), respectively. In the control treatment (well-mixed
interactions; CD), the level of cooperation was M =4% with
IQR=8%. In the static network (CD2), by contrast, the level of
cooperation rose to M =38% with IQR=45%, which is signif-
icantly higher than in CD despite a large variation in the data
(z-score −8.051; two-tailed Mann–Whitney U test p< 10−9).
Interestingly, in the static network with punishment (CDP2),
the level of cooperation was M =37% with IQR=40%, prac-
tically the same as in CD2 (z-score −0.326; two-tailed Mann–
Whitney U test p=0.741). The same cooperativeness of
participants in CD2 and CDP2 was surprising and shows that
punishment fails to boost the cooperation-promoting effect of
network reciprocity. It is furthermore notable that the lower level
of defection in CDP2 relative to CD2 (M =52%, IQR=36%
vs. M =62%, IQR=46%, respectively) happened only because
some participants replaced defection with punishment (M =7%,
IQR=10%) when this action was available.
To confirm that network reciprocity truly promotes cooper-
ation, aside from a higher overall cooperativeness in the static
network (CD2) compared with the well-mixed interactions (CD),
it was necessary to determine whether or not the level of coop-
eration in CD2 decreased over time. We found that the well-
mixed interactions were detrimental for cooperativeness, even
though the level of cooperation could be quite high initially (Fig.
2A). During the first 10 rounds of CD, the nonlinear transient
Li et al. PNAS | January 2, 2018 | vol. 115 | no. 1 | 31
Fig. 2. Punishment interferes with the cooperation-stabilizing effect of
network reciprocity. (A) Network reciprocity maintains a much higher fre-
quency of cooperation than the well-mixed interactions. As indicated by the
regression analysis, this frequency keeps slowly increasing over time at the
expense of the frequency of defection. (B) When punishment is introduced,
the frequency of cooperation is still relatively high, but the overall trend
is now decreasing, thus hinting at a destabilizing impact of punishment on
cooperation. The first 10 rounds are discarded in the regression analysis due
to the strong nontransient dynamics at the beginning of experimental ses-
sions. Smaller fonts indicate 95% confidence intervals.
dynamics was evidently strong, after which cooperativeness
plunged to very low levels and stayed there for the remainder
of a typical experimental session. Network reciprocity, however,
was capable of maintaining a high level of cooperation through-
out the experiment, despite some variability in the data (Fig. 2A).
The regression analysis, after discarding the first 10 rounds, indi-
cated that network reciprocity prevented cooperativeness from
decreasing because the corresponding line slope was positive and
statistically significant. This result was in sharp contrast with the
experimental outcome when punishment was available (CDP2).
In CDP2 (Fig. 2B), although the overall level of cooperation was
similar as in CD2, the regression analysis revealed that a line with
negative, statistically significant slope fits the data, thus suggest-
ing that, even after 50 rounds, cooperativeness was still decreas-
ing. The described results are, therefore, consistent with the
interpretation that punishment interferes with the cooperation-
promoting effect of network reciprocity.
We identified clustering as a fundamental, cooperation-pro-
moting mechanism in static networks (SI Appendix, SI Results
and Fig. S4). Clustering is closely related to the concept of
assortment—a measure of the extent to which cooperators rec-
ognize and group with other cooperators. To better under-
stand how network reciprocity stabilizes cooperation, we defined
assortment as a cooperator’s average fraction of cooperative
neighbors minus a defector’s and, when available, a punisher’s
average fraction of cooperative neighbors. The time evolution
of this quantity (Fig. 3A) showed that the level of assortment
in the static network (CD2) was consistently higher than in the
well-mixed interactions (CD). Moreover, the regression analysis
indicated that the static network stabilized assortment because
the corresponding line slope was statistically indistinguishable
from zero. A similar result was obtained in the presence of
punishment (CDP2; Fig. 3B), but the level of assortment was
consistently lower than in CD2 (z score 4.429; two-tailed Mann–
Whitney U test p< 10−5). In accordance with these results, pun-
ishment lowered the ability of cooperators to associate with other
like-minded individuals.
In analyzing the anticipated synergies of network reciprocity
and punishment, besides the overall level of cooperation, it is
important to look at success as measured by payoff. An intu-
itive representation of payoff distributions by using the proba-
bility density (Fig. 4A) showed that network reciprocity (CD2)
led to considerably higher payoffs per round than the well-
mixed interactions (CD). The payoff in CD was M =0.62 with
IQR=0.68 as opposed to M =1.52 with IQR=1.68 in CD2 (z
score −5.830; two-tailed Mann–Whitney U test p< 10−8; Fig.
4B). When punishment was introduced (CDP2), the distribution
of payoffs was still wider than in CD, but narrower than in CD2
(Fig. 4A; see also Fig. 4B for pairwise comparisons). This narrow-
ing was sufficient to push the payoff per round in CDP2 back to
M =0.58 with IQR=1.70, which was indistinguishable from the
level recorded in CD (z score−0.171; two-tailed Mann–Whitney
U test p=0.864; Fig. 4B). An inescapable conclusion here is that
punishment harms the payoff per round, especially at the high
end of the attainable range.
Generally, an action that leads to a higher payoff under the
given circumstances is said to be better adjusted to these circum-
stances. We could therefore gain an insight into which actions
were well-adjusted or maladjusted by analyzing the correlation
between payoffs per round and action frequencies. We found
that when the interactions were well-mixed (CD), cooperation
was a maladjusted action because the regression analysis indi-
cated that more cooperative individuals ended up with a lower
payoff per round (Fig. 5A). This situation was reversed in the
static network (CD2), wherein more cooperative individuals
were rewarded with a higher payoff per round. The same result
was valid when punishment became available (CDP2), yet the
slope of the corresponding regression line was notably lower than
in CD2 (2.6 vs. 1.9; Fig. 5A). A lower slope in CDP2 relative to
CD2 hinted at a potentially negative influence of punishment.
This issue is addressed thoroughly below.
Defection in CD and CD2 exhibited exactly the opposite char-
acteristics to cooperation due to the constraint that frequencies
of cooperation and defection must sum to unity (Fig. 5B). Defec-
tion is thus a well-adjusted action in CD, but maladjusted in CD2.
Furthermore, defection in CDP2 has similar characteristics as in
Fig. 3. Punishment lowers the ability of cooperators to associate with
one another. (A) Network reciprocity (CD2) stabilizes assortment—inter-
preted here as a measure of how well cooperators associate with other
cooperators—at a much higher level than in the well-mixed interactions
(CD). This stability is implied by the regression analysis because the line slope
in CD2 is statistically indistinguishable from zero. (B) Although assortment
is not destabilized by punishment (CDP2), as indicated by the corresponding
line slope which is also statistically indistinguishable from zero, the achieved
level of assortment in CDP2 is consistently lower than in CD2. The first 10
rounds are discarded in the regression analysis due to the strong nontran-
sient dynamics at the beginning of experimental sessions. Smaller fonts indi-
cate 95% confidence intervals.
























Fig. 4. Punishment reduces the obtainable payoff. (A) Probability densi-
ties intuitively show that network reciprocity (CD2) has a positive effect on
the payoff per round, allowing much higher values to be attained than the
well-mixed interactions (CD). Punishment (CDP2) partly counters this posi-
tive effect. (B) Cumulative probability distributions of the payoff per round
reveal a much higher median in CD2 than CD. When punishment is intro-
duced, despite similar levels of cooperativeness in CD2 and CDP2, the median
payoff is brought down to the value reached in the well-mixed interac-
tions. Pairwise comparisons indicate that all three distributions are signif-
icantly different from one another (two-sided Kolmogorov–Smirnov test;
p< 10−5 for CD vs. CD2; p= 7.8 × 10−4 for CD2 vs. CDP2; p= 0.019 for
CD vs. CDP2).
CD2. This was reflected in the negative, statistically significant
slope of regression lines between the payoff per round and the
frequency of defection in both CD2 and CDP2, although the lat-
ter slope was notably lower in absolute value (−2.6 vs. −1.6; Fig.
5B). In fact, the goodness of fit for the regression line in CDP2
was statistically indistinguishable from zero, giving us another
hint that punishment poorly interacts with network reciprocity.
Fig. 5. Network reciprocity awards cooperativeness with less success when punishment is available. (A) Cooperation is a maladjusted action when the
interactions are well-mixed (CD) because the corresponding payoff per round correlates negatively with the frequency of cooperation. Network reciprocity
(CD2), by contrast, makes cooperation a preferable action as indicated by the positive correlation between the payoff and cooperation. After introducing
punishment (CDP2), cooperation is still a preferable action, but the corresponding line slope is notably (although not statistically) lower. (B) Opposite to
cooperation, defection is a preferable action in CD, but maladjusted in CD2. Whether defection is still maladjusted in CDP2 is questionable. While the
estimate of the corresponding line slope is negative and statistically different from zero, the overall goodness of fit is indistinguishable from zero—the
apparent correlation between the payoff per round and the frequency of defection may well be a fluke. (C) Punishment appears to be a maladjusted
action, but seldom use of this action and considerable scatter preclude any statistical significance. Smaller fonts indicate 95% confidence intervals.
The full extent of the problem became apparent in the static net-
work in which neighborhood size equaled four (SI Appendix, SI
Results).
Neighborhood size was an important factor affecting net-
work reciprocity. Specifically, if neighborhood size increased,
the level of cooperation decreased (cf M =38%, IQR=45%
in CD2 vs. M =9.0%, IQR=26% in CD4; z score 4.670; two-
tailed Mann–Whitney U test p< 10−5; SI Appendix, Fig. S6).
As before, aiding network reciprocity with punishment failed to
increase cooperativeness (cf M =9.0%, IQR=26% in CD4 vs.
M =9.4%, IQR=15% in CDP4; z score −0.280; two-tailed
Mann–WhitneyU test p=0.779). Furthermore, almost the same
levels of cooperation in CD4 and CDP4, and only a slightly
lower level of defection (M =88%, IQR=37%) in the latter
treatment, implied that punishment (M =4.7%, IQR=13%)
was used as an occasional replacement for defection, but to no
avail—network reciprocity weakened with neighborhood size.
This notion was confirmed when success in terms of the payoff per
round was related to action use (SI Appendix, Fig. S7). As
expected, cooperation was a maladjusted action in the control
treatment (CD). Although network reciprocity (CD2) improved
the prospects of cooperators, it was insufficient to establish a
positive correlation between success and cooperativeness. The
most defeating result, however, was that punishment (CDP4)
counteracted the positive effect of network reciprocity by mak-
ing cooperation a maladjusted action once again. This result cor-
roborated what was only a hint in CDP2; namely, punishment
acted to erase the reward that network reciprocity brought to
cooperators.
Discussion
Social dilemma experiments described here yielded two main re-
sults. First, network reciprocity has proven effective in promoting
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cooperation (Figs. 1 and 2). This result confirmed the recent find-
ings in ref. 39, with the addition of identifying clustering as the
key mechanism by which network reciprocity promotes cooper-
ativeness (SI Appendix, Fig. S4). Clustering is interesting from
an ecological perspective because closely related animals often
protect themselves or gain food more efficiently by gathering in
groups such as herds. Human ability to communicate may have
helped to extend these grouping tendencies beyond just the clos-
est relatives.
Nevertheless, the levels of cooperation in the static network
remained significantly below 50%, thus suggesting room for
improvement. This naturally led to a question of whether aid-
ing network reciprocity with another hypothesized cooperation-
promoting mechanism—such as punishment—would boost the
level of cooperation observed in static networks. Much to our
surprise, punishment not only failed to boost cooperativeness,
but also countered some positive aspects of network reciprocity.
Why? Our data suggest an interplay between three different
factors.
Decreased assortment in the static network with punishment
(Fig. 3) is an indication that cooperators have a harder time
identifying one another when punishing is possible. A likely rea-
son is that punishment sends a mixed signal to neighbors. While
the implied message when punishing someone is “I want you to
be cooperative,” the immediate effect is more consistent with
the message “I want to hurt you.” Evidence that punishing in
social dilemma experiments can be interpreted in the latter way is
seen in occasional retaliatory use of punishment whereby partic-
ipants punish one another consecutively for several rounds with-
out becoming any more cooperative than they were to begin with
(31, 32). This furthermore suggests that a response to punish-
ment may be driven by impulse as much as reason, if not more.
The fact that punishment reduces the payoff per round (Fig.
4) reveals an overall demoralizing effect of this action. Namely,
individuals who get punished on multiple occasions may see a
good chunk of their total payoff vanish in a short period. Break-
ing off from the rest of the pack thus becomes more difficult,
which in turn may cause doubts about one’s performance. With
grim prospects for achieving a satisfactory success, players may
lose interest in the game and play the remaining rounds in a less
coherent manner.
Even if players remain interested in the game to the last round,
punishment seems to reduce—if not eliminate—the incentive
to eventually choose cooperation over defection. Namely, from
the perspective of evolutionary game theory, completely ratio-
nal players should cling only to actions that lead to an above-
average payoff, whereas other actions should die out. This type
of “selection” process should persist until only the best action(s)
remain. Although the behavior of human participants in a social
dilemma experiment may deviate from complete rationality, it is
in line with our expectations that success, expressed in terms of
the payoff per round, correlates positively with the frequency of
cooperation in static networks (Fig. 5). Otherwise there would
be little rationale to select cooperation over defection. However,
even the results in a smaller-size neighborhood already hint that
punishment blurs the positive correlation between success and
cooperativeness. This hint is confirmed in a larger-size neighbor-
hood in which network reciprocity is weaker and thereby unable
to prevent punishment from completely reversing the correla-
tion between success and cooperativeness (SI Appendix, Fig. S7).
Players, therefore, have no way of learning to associate cooper-
ation with success, which makes a wider adoption of this action
unlikely.
Punishment has proven ineffective in our experiment, which
begs the question why punishing is so ubiquitous in the real
world. A partial answer would be that human brain seems to
be hardwired to derive pleasure from punishing defectors (47).
From a fundamental perspective, however, a more satisfying
answer would be that there are alternative situations in which
punishment’s role as a cooperation promoter is substantial. We
speculate that such situations may include asymmetries whereby
one dominant side has the ability to punish without provoking
retaliation. Perhaps even a variant of the present experiment
would end up differently if punishment brought “more bang for
the buck,” i.e., if the fine associated with punishment in Eq. 1
were higher. This brings us to an important limitation of our and
similar approaches.
In analyzing our experimental results, general conclusions
about human behavior were drawn based on the use of a single
or, at best, a few payoff matrices such as the one in Eq. 1. Instead
of basing conclusions on limited information, a preferred course
of action would be to specify and systematically vary six parame-
ters in the unilateral payoff matrix. However, executing the nec-
essary number of treatments and replicates may cause consid-
erable logistic strain on experimenters. Examples of such strain
include the need for an excessive number of recruits, the financial
burden of repeatedly paying participation fees, and an increase
in the time required to execute all aspects of an experimental
study. In the face of the described limitation, therefore, we have
little choice but to extract valuable insights from the available
data while keeping in mind that it would be unwise to extrapo-
late the implications of social dilemma experiments on human
behavior far beyond the setting in which these experiments were
conducted in the first place.
Materials and Methods
Experimental Methods. For the purpose of conducting the experimental
treatments described herein (CD, CD2, and CDP2), we recruited 225 under-
graduate volunteers—mean age 20.2 y; female-to-male ratio approximately
1:1; multiple majors—from two universities in China: Tianjin University
of Finance and Economics in Tianjin and Yunnan University of Finance
and Economics in Kunming (for more details, see SI Appendix, SI Mate-
rials and Methods and Table S1). All participants engaged in a repeated
PD game played in the professionally designed computer laboratories of
both universities. Upon arrival, participants were randomly assigned to
isolated computer cubicles, where a computer screen would display the
instructions on experimental procedures. Subsequently, all participants were
required to complete a short questionnaire (SI Appendix, Fig. S1) to verify
their basic understanding of the game rules. Before beginning an exper-
imental session, several practice rounds were played against two random
opponents to let participants familiarize themselves with the experimental
interface (SI Appendix, Fig. S2A). Opponents were kept anonymous apart
from displaying an “opponent number” to allow examining the result of
each action more easily (SI Appendix, Fig. S2B). Treatments were imple-
mented in z-Tree, a specialized software package for socioeconomic exper-
iments (48).
The three experimental treatments differed in (i) how participants con-
nected with one another and (ii) what actions were at their disposal.
In the control treatment (CD), each participant played a traditional PD
game—in which cooperation (C) and defection (D) were the only avail-
able actions—against two opponents at a time. These opponents were
randomly chosen in each round (42). In the static network (CD2), oppo-
nents were no longer randomly chosen, but instead participants formed
a ring in which the first two neighbors acted as the game opponents (SI
Appendix, Fig. S3). This arrangement was unchanged during the game.
Finally, the static network with punishment (CDP2) differed from CD2 only
in that punishment (P) was available as an independent action. According
to these definitions, the role of treatments CD2 and CDP2 was to estab-
lish the cooperation-promoting effect of network reciprocity relative to
CD and the cooperation-boosting effect of punishment relative to CD2,
respectively.
All treatments consisted of two replicates (i.e., sessions or games) played
between December 2015 and September 2016 by participants who had no
prior experience with this kind of social dilemma experiments. No partici-
pant was allowed to play more than once. A game consisted of 50 rounds,
which took ∼1 h to complete. Participants remained unaware of the exact
number of rounds to avoid possible finite-game opportunism (49). One
round was completed only after all participants chose their preferred actions
and examined the consequences thereof. The time allotted for each of these
tasks was 30 s.
























Players’ success was measured in terms of their total payoff, updated
after every round as prescribed by Eq. 1. This payoff was added to an initial
endowment of 50 points. To provide participants with an incentive, the final
endowment accumulated throughout a game was translated into the Chi-
nese renminbi at a rate of ¥0.5 per point. If the accumulated endowment
was negative, participants would still get a show-up fee of ¥15. Eearnings
ranged from ¥15 to ¥148, with an average of ¥65. Before being paid out,
participants were asked to confirm their final endowment and sign a cash
receipt form.
Statistical Methods. Probability distributions behind socioeconomic data are
rarely known. To avoid assuming any underlying distribution, we used non-
parametric descriptors (e.g., median and IQR) and statistical tests (e.g.,
Mann–Whitney U test). Furthermore, linear regression analyses were used
to determine trends and correlations in the data. Because socioeconomic
data often exhibit high variation by which a few data points can dispro-
portionately affect the results of the ordinary least squares regression, we
replaced squared with absolute distances and thus reduced the effect of the
potential outliers on the estimated regression parameters. This was quali-
tatively similar to using the quantile regression, except that minimizing the
sum of absolute distances allowed for a more intuitive interpretation. The
goodness of fit was assessed by using a measure analogous to the square
root of the coefficient of determination, defined as Rabs = 1 − SAres/SAtot,
where SAres is the sum of absolute residuals and SAtot is the sum of absolute
distances from the data mean. By definition, 0 ≤ Rabs ≤ 1, where the lower
(upper) bound signifies the presence (absence) of random scatter. All 95%
confidence intervals were obtained by means of bootstrapping.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS. We thank J. H. Lee for useful discussions. M.J.
and Z.W. were, respectively, supported by the Research Grant Program
of Inamori Foundation and the Chinese Young 1000 Talents Plan. B.P.
received support from the Slovenian Research Agency (ARRS) and the Croa-
tian Science Foundation through Projects J5-8236 and 5349, respectively.
S.H. thanks the Israel-Italian collaborative project Network Cyber Security
(NECST), Israel Science Foundation, Office of Naval Research (ONR), Japan
Science Foundation, and the US-Israel Binational Science Foundation and
the US National Science Foundation (BSF-NSF) for financial support. The
Boston University Center for Polymer Studies is supported by NSF Grants
PHY-1505000, CMMI-1125290, and CHE-1213217, by Defense Threat Reduc-
tion Agency (DTRA) Grant HDTRA1-14-1-0017, and by Department of Energy
(DOE) Contract DE-AC07-05Id14517.
1. Axelrod R, Hamilton WD (1981) The evolution of cooperation. Science 211:1390–1396.
2. Weibull JW (1997) Evolutionary Game Theory (MIT Press, Cambridge, MA).
3. Trivers RL (1971) The evolution of reciprocal altruism. Q Rev Biol 46:35–57.
4. Pennisi E (2009) On the origin of cooperation. Science 325:1196–1199.
5. Szabo´ G, Fath G (2007) Evolutionary games on graphs. Phys Rep 446:97–216.
6. Hofbauer J, Sigmund K (1998) Evolutionary Games and Population Dynamics (Cam-
bridge Univ Press, Cambridge, UK).
7. Mobilia M (2012) Stochastic dynamics of the prisoner’s dilemma with cooperation
facilitators. Phys Rev E 86:011134.
8. Wang Z, Kokubo S, Jusup M, Tanimoto J (2015) Universal scaling for the dilemma
strength in evolutionary games. Phys Life Rev 14:1–30.
9. Rapoport A (1965) Prisoner’s Dilemma: A Study in Conflict and Cooperation (Univ of
Michigan Press, Ann Arbor, MI).
10. Helbing D, Yu W (2009) The outbreak of cooperation among success-driven individu-
als under noisy conditions. Proc Natl Acad Sci USA 106:3680–3685.
11. Fischbacher U, Ga¨chter S, Fehr E (2001) Are people conditionally cooperative? Evi-
dence from a public goods experiment. Econ Lett 71:397–404.
12. Nowak MA (2006) Five rules for the evolution of cooperation. Science 314:1560–1563.
13. Roca CP, Cuesta JA, Sa´nchez A (2009) Evolutionary game theory: Temporal and spatial
effects beyond replicator dynamics. Phys Life Rev 6:208–249.
14. Traulsen A, Semmann D, Sommerfeld RD, Krambeck HJ, Milinski M (2010) Human
strategy updating in evolutionary games. Proc Natl Acad Sci USA 107:2962–2966.
15. Perc M, Szolnoki A (2010) Coevolutionary games: A mini review. BioSystems 99:
109–125.
16. Nowak MA, Sigmund K (1992) Tit for tat in heterogeneous populations. Nature
355:250–253.
17. Milinski M, Semmann D, Krambeck HJ (2002) Reputation helps solve the “tragedy of
the commons”. Nature 415:424–426.
18. Wedekind C, Milinski M (2000) Cooperation through image scoring in humans. Sci-
ence 288:850–852.
19. Sigmund K, Hauert C, Nowak MA (2001) Reward and punishment. Proc Natl Acad Sci
USA 98:10757–10762.
20. Jime´nez R, Lugo H, Cuesta JA, Sa´nchez A (2008) Emergence and resilience of coop-
eration in the spatial prisoner’s dilemma via a reward mechanism. J Theor Biol 250:
475–483.
21. Sefton M, Shupp R, Walker JM (2007) The effect of rewards and sanctions in provision
of public goods. Econ Inq 45:671–690.
22. Ertan A, Page T, Putterman L (2009) Who to punish? Individual decisions and majority
rule in mitigating the free rider problem. Eur Econ Rev 53:495–511.
23. Fehr E, Ga¨chter S (2002) Altruistic punishment in humans. Nature 415:137–140.
24. Henrich J, et al. (2006) Costly punishment across human societies. Science 312:
1767–1770.
25. Rockenbach B, Milinski M (2006) The efficient interaction of indirect reciprocity and
costly punishment. Nature 444:718–723.
26. Boyd R, Gintis H, Bowles S, Richerson PJ (2003) The evolution of altruistic punishment.
Proc Natl Acad Sci USA 100:3531–3535.
27. Fowler JH (2005) Altruistic punishment and the origin of cooperation. Proc Natl Acad
Sci USA 102:7047–7049.
28. Traulsen A, Hauert C, De Silva H, Nowak MA, Sigmund K (2009) Exploration dynamics
in evolutionary games. Proc Natl Acad Sci USA 106:709–712.
29. Ohtsuki H, Iwasa Y, Nowak MA (2009) Indirect reciprocity provides only a narrow
margin of efficiency for costly punishment. Nature 457:79–82.
30. Wu JJ, et al. (2009) Costly punishment does not always increase cooperation. Proc
Natl Acad Sci USA 106:17448–17451.
31. Wang Z, et al. (2017) Onymity promotes cooperation in social dilemma experiments.
Sci Adv 3:e1601444.
32. Dreber A, Rand DG, Fudenberg D, Nowak MA (2008) Winners don’t punish. Nature
452:348–351.
33. Nowak MA, May RM (1992) Evolutionary games and spatial chaos. Nature 359:
826–829.
34. Santos FC, Pacheco JM (2005) Scale-free networks provide a unifying framework for
the emergence of cooperation. Phys Rev Lett 95:098104.
35. Go´mez-Garden˜es J, Campillo M, Florı´a L, Moreno Y (2007) Dynamical organization of
cooperation in complex topologies. Phys Rev Lett 98:108103.
36. Holme P, Trusina A, Kim BJ, Minnhagen P (2003) Prisoner’s dilemma in real-world
acquaintance networks: Spikes and quasi-equilibria induced by the interplay between
structure and dynamics. Phys Rev E 68:030901.
37. Wang WX, Lai YC, Grebogi C, Ye J (2011) Network reconstruction based on
evolutionary-game data via compressive sensing. Phys Rev X 1:021021.
38. Wang Z, Szolnoki A, Perc M (2013) Interdependent network reciprocity in evolution-
ary games. Sci Rep 3:1183.
39. Rand DG, Nowak MA, Fowler JH, Christakis NA (2014) Static network structure can
stabilize human cooperation. Proc Natl Acad Sci USA 111:17093–17098.
40. Gracia-La´zaro C, et al. (2012) Heterogeneous networks do not promote coopera-
tion when humans play a prisoner’s dilemma. Proc Natl Acad Sci USA 109:12922–
12926.
41. Wang J, Suri S, Watts DJ (2012) Cooperation and assortativity with dynamic partner
updating. Proc Natl Acad Sci USA 109:14363–14368.
42. Rand DG, Arbesman S, Christakis NA (2011) Dynamic social networks promote coop-
eration in experiments with humans. Proc Natl Acad Sci USA 108:19193–19198.
43. Fehl K, van der Post DJ, Semmann D (2011) Co-evolution of behaviour and social
network structure promotes human cooperation. Ecol Lett 14:546–551.
44. Helbing D, Szolnoki A, Perc M, Szabo´ G (2010) Punish, but not too hard: How costly
punishment spreads in the spatial public goods game. New J Phys 12:083005.
45. Helbing D, Szolnoki A, Perc M, Szabo´ G (2010) Evolutionary establishment of
moral and double moral standards through spatial interactions. PLoS Comput Biol
6:e1000758.
46. Szolnoki A, Perc M (2013) Correlation of positive and negative reciprocity fails to
confer an evolutionary advantage: Phase transitions to elementary strategies. Phys
Rev X 3:041021.
47. De Quervain DJ, et al. (2004) The neural basis of altruistic punishment. Science
305:1254–1258.
48. Fischbacher U (2007) z-tree: Zurich toolbox for ready-made economic experiments.
Exp Econ 10:171–178.
49. Bo´ PD (2005) Cooperation under the shadow of the future: Experimental evidence
from infinitely repeated games. Am Econ Rev 95:1591–1604.
Li et al. PNAS | January 2, 2018 | vol. 115 | no. 1 | 35
